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Abstract 
This paper assesses the distributional effects of different vehicle registration taxes, while 
placing them into context of external costs in Estonian transportation. It is found that 
proposed Estonian vehicle registration tax is strongly regressive, as tax share decreases with 
income in every income decile. However, as these tax revenues do not cover external costs 
of 366 million euros in passenger car transport that are found in thesis beforehand, 
alternative tax scenario taking into account EU emissions goals and former figure is 
designed and studied. It is established that while focusing on new registrations, tax of 
approximately 18000€ per vehicle would internalize the external costs caused by passenger 
cars. 
Keywords: externalities, distributional effects, internalisation, environmental tax, 
transportation 
1 Introduction 
Over the recent past, European Union member states and other countries in general have set 
targets for the reduction in pollution and emission of greenhouse gases, which have 
facilitated the use of environmental taxes across the world, especially in the EU. As a result 
of recent concerns relating to the harmful effects of global warming, policy makers have 
become increasingly interested in the use of environmental taxation as a means of combating 
the problem, in order to meet targets set at the 1997 Kyoto protocol and Paris agreement 
2015 to reduce greenhouse gases. Beginning with the Scandinavian countries in 1990s, there 
has been a number of attempts to introduce Environmental Tax Reform in EU member states 
by aiming to shift the burden of taxation away from factors of production to pollution and 
the users of natural resources (Abdullah & Morley, 2014). 
As environmental tax revenue predominantly consists of taxes on transport and energy 
products, one way of to address said goal is to set focus on vehicle taxation, which further 
relates to the ownership and use of motor vehicles. 
Travelling in a private vehicle does bring benefits to individual using it; however, alongside 
entails external costs to society as a whole, as it involves noise, pollution, accidents etc. All 
of this means negatively affecting public health and quality of life, a fact not taken into 
account during the decision-making process when choosing whether and which type of 
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vehicle to purchase. In a sense, this is a market failure due to ignored external costs, as 
marginal costs of using a car by the owner are lower than the marginal social costs (OECD, 
2016). Governments can combat this by implementing market-based instruments to 
internalize external costs, one way being to introduce car purchase tax based on its 
emissions. For example in 2016, 20 out of 28 EU member states have implemented carbon 
dioxide (CO2) based motor vehicle taxes (ACEA, 2016). Some countries, such as Israel, 
have approached the issue by including more pollutants in addition to CO2 -  for instance 
emissions of PMx (particular matter) and NO2, two of the influential measures connected 
with causing local health effects (Pope & Dockery, 1995) (OSHA, 2016) - as to further 
address the extent of externalities in road transportation (OECD, 2016).  
As any tax, vehicle tax, whether registration or ownership based, will have distributional 
effects on members of society. In literature, distributional effects of transportation taxes have 
often been examined as a part of environmental taxes, as is done in (Aasness & Larsen, 
2003) and (Ahola, Carlsson, & Sterner, 2009). In these cases, distributional effects have been 
investigated for taxing motor fuel (Tuuli, 2009) or looking at excise taxes (Kosonen, 2012). 
There is, however, little work done to examine if and to extent will vehicle owners be 
influenced by taxation of car emissions. Even more profound research gap exists in Estonia, 
where despite the oldest and most polluting vehicle park in Europe (ACEA, 2014), no 
methodical research has been published proposing or analysing vehicle tax countering said 
fact. 
Current dissertation will ex ante analyse planned Estonian car registration tax1 and its share 
of owners’ income to better perceive which income deciles are influenced to greater extent. 
That is to say, potential progressivity or regressivity of tax will be under focus. For this, 
vehicle emission and owners’ income data from Estonian Tax and Customs Board is used 
and complemented with available emission information from car manufacturer. 
Distributional effects will then be examined looking at tax-to-income shares and several 
distributional measures. 
In addition to analysis of Estonian vehicle tax, tax scenarios of other nations and their 
application in Estonian context will be explored, with focus on countries that include wider 
range of external costs in establishing their respective taxation. To further investigate 
                                                 
1 Dicussed registration tax would be implemented on registration and based on CO2 or in case of older vehicles 
on engine capacity, however proposal was withdrawn as of May 2015. 
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taxation of road transport externalities, a tax taking into account CO2 and NO2 emissions; 
European vehicle emission standards and future goals (ACEA, 2017) will be designed and its 
distributional effects analysed. Significant element is matching tax revenues with external 
costs of passenger car transport that are found in present thesis beforehand. This evaluation 
can provide relevant evidence for policymakers, as to what extent vehicle tax ought to reach 
in order to internalize the costs caused by car owners and whether the quantity is genuinely 
reachable or would the taxable sum stand at undesirably large share of peoples income. This 
process makes it the first case in literature where tax is designed and analysed to fully 
account for external costs of transport sector. All research is done separately for personal car 
owners and company car owners. 
Following structure of paper is used. Section 2 will provide a theoretical framework of 
environmental and transport taxes arising from concept of external costs. Third section will 
give an overview of transport taxes in effect in OECD countries, while section 4 will present 
an overview of data and used methodology. Empirical findings of tax scenarios, their 
analysis and possible policy implications will then conclude the research. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Externalities from road transport 
This section discusses the concept of environmental taxation, more specifically incentives 
and background for such taxation while also examining distributional effects of 
environmental and transportation taxes. 
The idea of environmental taxation is based on the theory of market failures, more 
specifically externalities. Externalities can be either positive or negative, i.e. one can 
differentiate between external costs and external benefits, based on whether consumption or 
production of some good creates negative or positive effects to a not involved – external – 
party. The party(-ies) causing such externalities does not receive or pay compensation for 
influencing others’ utility levels; in other words, supplier does not take effects of his 
behaviour into account in one’s decision making process (Baumol & Oates, 1995). 
Essentially, existence of externalities leads to a market failure via deviation from socially 
optimal resource allocation to a situation, where market prices no longer reflect social costs 
or benefits (Verhoef, 1994). This means additional taxes or subsidies, respectively, are 
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needed to restore efficient allocation. For instance in case of negative externalities depicted 
in Figure 1, this altogether results in inefficiently high quantity of any good that can be 
associated with such externality. On said figure, amount of externalities would be vertical 
difference of social(MSC) and private cost(MPC) lines, measured at same quantity. Ideal 
equilibrium reflecting social costs is at Popt in the crossing of marginal social costs and 
marginal social benefits, while actual equilibrium in unfettered market is at P1. 
Here, in framework of road transportation, it is of importance to distinguish between (1) 
social costs that reflect all costs which occur in result of provision and use of transportation 
(wear of infrastructure, capital costs) and (2) private costs, directly borne by the transport 
user (transport taxes and charges, wear and energy cost of vehicle use). External costs here 
reflect the difference of social and private costs (Handbook, 2014). According to economic 
welfare theory, all marginal social costs occurring in result of transportation activity ought to 
be paid by transport users. Considering private marginal costs, optimal infrastructure charges 
should reflect the marginal external costs of use of infrastructure such as wear of 
infrastructure, congestion and environmental costs. These costs are connected to fixed 
infrastructure capacity and thus not relevant in the short run, however opposite is true in the 
long run as construction of additional roads alters capacity. This means for efficient pricing 
of existing roads, short run marginal costs are of concern, whereas the long run marginal 
costs in addition have to consider the financing of infrastructure extensions The separation 
between short and long run marginal costs is based on treatment of existing infrastructure 
costs – both fixed and variable – and connected financing schemes as transport taxes and 
fees (Handbook, 2014). Hence, it is useful to differentiate between infrastructure related 
costs, and taxes from other external cost components.  
One general feature of externalities is that effect produced is not a deliberate creation rather 
than unintended by-product of some legitimate activity (Mishan, 1971), meaning intentional 
criminal activity or altruism do not qualify as external costs or benefits, as do not barter trade 
and occurrence of pecuniary benefits (Verhoef, 1994). 
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Figure 1: Negative externalities (Dietz, 2012) 
In road transportation, the existence of externalities has been established in literature, 
although external benefits - which are not discussed in current thesis - and their relevance are 
still a matter of dispute2. External costs of road transportation are more agreed upon on. 
Arguably one of the most extensive research on valuation of external costs to date 
(Handbook, 2008) has defined three main cost components of external costs in transport to 
be (1) congestion and scarcity costs; (2) accident costs; (3) environmental costs. Each 
component influences different extent of people, as when environmental externalities are 
imposed on society at large, congestion costs are relevant to collective withheld in traffic, 
whereas external accident costs are typically enforced on clearly identifiable individuals. 
Significant consideration of road transport market is simultaneous treatment of externalities, 
meaning level of one externality can influence the level of others with of congestion and air 
pollution being clear example. Hence, any policy intervention directed towards such 
externality will have an influence on others  (Calthrop & Proost, 1998). Therefore in 
principle emission standards, congestion taxes etc. have to be decided simultaneously. 
Of environmental pressures, most literature has focused on costs of air pollution, noise, 
accidents, congestion and climate change, while effects of odour, vibrations, water and soil 
pollution are more rarely used, although not ignored. 
                                                 
2 Whether to include benefits of infrastructure as external benefits and effects to general well-being as external 
benefits of transportation are cause of many arguments, see for example (Diekmann, 1991) (in German, 
summarized by (Johansson, et al., 1996)) and (Rietveld, 1989). 
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Several valid methods have been used for quantifying pressures monetarily. However, one 
that considers technology, site specific parameters3 and effect of time on costs is impact 
pathway (IPA) method (HEATCO, 2005). IPA follows a progression from emission of 
pollutants to quantification of each impact monetary wise (Figure 2). Although IPAs 
principles are applicable for all pressures, it is mostly used for quantifying air pollution, soil 
pollution and externalities of noise. 
  
Figure 2: Impact Pathway approach to quantifying road externalities. Compiled by author 
based on (HEATCO, 2005). 
In case of external congestion costs, it is of essence to differentiate between congestions in 
cities and that in highways. In latter case, it is necessary to evaluate speed-flow curves for 
which data for traffic intensity, speeds and information about cross section of roads is 
needed. In case of cities, traffic is modelled comparing current time costs of rush hour to 
simulated optimal case, which can be seen as free-flow speed in streets. Cost of time and 
giving monetary values is then dependent on length and purpose of trip, for example in 
minimal there ought to be differentiation between trips made for purpose of business and 
non-business (Jüssi, Anspal, & Kallaste, 2008). For former, marginal productivity of worker 
should be estimated for further valuation of such congestion costs; in case of non-business 
trips, willingness-to-pay estimations for saved time are used. Until last decade in urban 
transport, often used function was one relating average speed exponentially to traffic flow, 
                                                 
3 E.g. noise impact in densly populated city at nighttime vs noise in sparsely populated rural area. 
Monetary valuation of damages
(Physical) Impact: change in usage value, loss of welfare
Exposure: Reaction of receptor
Dispersion modelling: Spread and precipitation of pollution
Activity/burden: pollutant emission from transport
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measured by passenger car units per hour. Monetary values were then given by willingness-
to-pay approach. (Mayers, Ochelen, & Proost, 1996).  
For accident costs, severity and location of accidents, under-reporting coefficients, 
distribution of accidents by types of transportation and estimated value of statistical life are 
needed. Costs of climate change are calculated based on fuel types, driver kilometres and are 
not location specific due to their global nature. 
As most described data is often not available on detailed and country specific levels, inputs 
from two papers, “Handbook on estimation of external cost in the transport sector” 
(IMPACT, 2007) and its later update (Handbook 2014) are used. IMPACT study is based on 
scientific works done at EU level and recommends best available input values for calculating 
external costs figures for EU member states, which can be used to produce necessary outputs 
with relatively high level of accurateness. Alongside, with lower reliability, estimated default 
unit values of external costs for direct use are provided. 
2.2 Principles of taxation and distributional effects 
Using taxation to correct negative externalities is to a large extent traced to Arthur Pigou and 
“The Economics of Welfare”, work on which term “Pigouvian tax” is based upon. In words 
of Pigou, “it is plain that divergences between private and social net product cannot ... be 
mitigated by a modification of the contractual relationship between any two contracting 
parties … it is, however, possible for the State to remove the divergence in any field by 
“extraordinary encouragements”” (Pigou, 1920). 
Under “extraordinary encouragements” taxes or subsidies are meant. Pigouvian tax is 
intended to correct suboptimal outcome, by equalling tax to social costs of negative 
externalities (Sandmo, 2008). Contrasting this is Pigouvian subsidy, which is used to 
encourage behaviour with positive external effects in order to increase production and thus 
countering possible under-supply by society. 
In current thesis, however, emphasis will be on taxes and not subsidies and thus definition of 
environmental tax is hereby provided. OECD explains environmentally related tax as “a tax 
whose tax base is a physical unit (or a proxy of it) that has a proven specific negative impact 
on the environment” (OECD, 2005). Similar definition is used by European Environment 
Agency, where environmental taxes are defined as “compulsory, unrequited payment to 
general government levied on tax-bases deemed to be of particular environmental relevance” 
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(EEA, 2002). Given comparable description, one could conclude with definition of two 
critical elements: environmental tax is (a) a compulsory payment which is (b) levied on some 
negative environmental matter. 
The level of environmental taxation is not one uniquely agreed upon. Whereas (Pigou, 1920) 
suggests tax level equating marginal costs of environmental damage, other authors have seen 
different approaches, not all of which are based on externalities. One approach is described 
in (Ramsey, 1927), where it is suggested to tax goods for which demand is most inelastic. 
More recent papers suggest that environmental tax levels should be set such to obtain 
environmental objectives by least-cost method (Baumol & Oates, 1995), others counter 
argue that imposed environmental taxes are arbitrary and do not express “right prices” at all  
(Common & Stagl, 2005). In (Bovenberg & Mooij, 1994) it was shown level of 
environmental levy will be dependent on already existing - mainly labour – taxes, and of 
how employment reacts to tax changes. Nonetheless, as focus in current thesis will be on 
road transportation externalities, Pigouvian tax concept shall thus attain most attention in 
following sections. 
Pigou tax is not without complications. Said tax rate should equal marginal costs of external 
cost, however following polluter-pays principle several difficulties occur, either related to 
quality and availability of monitoring or to the fact that external costs varies by source, 
amount of pollutants, number of people affected, location etc. (Williams, 2016) illustrated 
this simply by comparing marginal damage from emissions upwind of a major city to those 
in sparsely populated rural area. In addition to time and space variance, in practice 
estimating marginal damage is particularly complicated in cases where the potential harm 
will occur in the future. When emissions cannot be directly measured, taxing agencies often 
impose tax on some proxy of said emissions, such as amount of fuel burned. However, in 
case of applying proxies, tax would differ from its theoretical ideal. More of tax systems and 
how environmental and transport taxes fit into these frames will be discussed subsequently. 
Properties of a good tax system were defined by (Stiglitz, 1988) as efficiency, administrative 
simplicity, flexibility, political responsibility and equity. These were mostly mirrored by 
(Mirrlees, et al., 2011), where tax system objectives are described as minimizing negative 
effects on welfare and economic efficiency, low administration costs, transparency and 
fairness other than in distributional sense. Environmental taxes, however, have added 
dimensions, as ecological objectives, to address externalities, are now included. Among many 
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others, (OECD, 2010) has set following guidelines in “Taxation, Innovation and the 
Environment” on how to design environmental taxes: 
 Environmental tax bases should be levied as directly as possible to the pollutant or 
action causing the environmental damage, with few, if any, exceptions. 
 The scope of tax should ideally be as broad as the scope of the environmental damage 
with credible and predictable tax rate similar to environmental damage. 
 Environmental tax revenues can assist fiscal consolidation or help to reduce other 
taxes. 
 Distributional impacts can and generally should be addressed through other policy 
instruments. 
Here, latter suggestion can be traced to first two. Designing tax to address both distributional 
environmental goals and distributional issues can challenge its ability to do either. Creating 
income based exemptions diminishes tax’s environmental incentives and increases its 
administrative complexity; therefore it is suggested to address possible distributional matters 
by other policy measures as providing low-income supports or lowering income tax (Serret 
& Johnstone, 2006). 
Altogether, environmental taxes essentially serve two major purposes: in addition to focusing 
on environmental effectiveness, as a tax it correspondingly ought to bring funds to state 
without causing unnecessary distortions. 
As any other tax, environmental tax has distributional effects within taxpayers, as 
connections between income and tax burden will now be presented. Theory behind this 
linkage is based on horizontal and vertical equity, introduced by Richard Musgrave in 1959. 
Horizontal equity means people with same position should pay the same amount of tax, 
whereas vertical equity was defined as “requiring an appropriate pattern of differentiation 
among unequals” (Musgrave, 1959), which is to say those who are able ought to pay more 
tax. 
Related concepts are elasticity and the progressivity or regressivity of tax. The association 
between income and consumption of a good can be linear, decelerating or accelerating. In 
case of latter, where demand elasticity is higher than unity, the product is luxury good and 
taxing it will affect affluent people more, thus the tax is progressive. If connection is 
decelerating and unity lower than one, taxed good is a necessity. Here, if proportion of taxed 
13 
 
good decreases as income rises, it might indicate a regressive tax, where lower income 
people might be more affected (Poltimäe, 2014). 
To further analyse the distributional effects of taxation, mostly descriptive measures of 
income are commonly applied. These measures are usually based on Lorenz curve, showing 
deviation of person’s income from perfect equality (Kakwani, 2010). Originally meant by 
Max Lorenz to be solely descriptive graph, it was later modified for use of numerical 
calculations (Gini, 1912) as the information of Lorenz curve could be captured by some form 
of Gini index. Less used method of analysing changes in equality is normative approach, 
where commonly used measurement is the Atkinson index, constructed on idea of equally 
distributed equivalent level on income (Atkinson, 1970). 
Distributional effects of environmental taxes have been subject of numerous empirical 
studies since 1990s. Although measuring welfare changes might be of real interest, in papers 
income is mostly used as a proxy, as simply not enough information on individual utility 
function is available (Sen & Foster, 2003). Comprehensive summary of such studies has 
been done by (Poltimäe, 2014), with both direct and indirect effects under focus. Although 
results are not always in union, most studies find poorer people to pay greater proportion of 
environmental taxes in relation to their income level (Bork, 2006), though distributional 
effects clearly depend on the tax. 
Distributional effects of vehicle taxes, which are of concern in current dissertation, are 
dependent whether income or consumption data is used. As (Ahola, Carlsson, & Sterner, 
2009) found tax burden to increase up to eight decile using total expenditure of households, 
when using disposable income as denominator, burden of taxes was seen slightly higher in 
low-income classes. Tax was found to be strongly progressive in (Jacobsen, Birr-Pedersen, 
& Wier, 2003), where using expenditure data, transport taxes increased with income until 9th 
decile. Similar result was obtained in (Aasness & Larsen, 2003), which calculated Engel 
elasticities4 using Norwegian consumer data, showing progressivity (elasticity of 1.21) of 
transport as a whole, which was higher on vehicle purchases and road tolls, lower on bus 
rides and mopeds. In Finland, results from (Tuuli, 2009) indicate similar conclusions, as the 
share of taxes increased up to eight decile and lowered for highest consuming households. 
Outside Nordics, (Bureau, 2011) found carbon tax to be regressive with income before 
revenue recycling. Regressivity was mitigated while taking into account reduction of 
                                                 
4 Percentage change in spending on a good as total expenditure increases 1% 
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congestions, whereas different reallocation methods after tax made poorer households better 
off. 
Results on motor fuel taxes are slightly more mixed, as although they have been proposed to 
be progressive in most studies including (Tuuli, 2009), (Sterner, 2012) and in EU overall 
(Kosonen, 2012), some countries (USA, Italy) with regressive conclusions have been found 
(Sterner, et al. 2012), (Aasness & Larsen, 2003).  
In Estonia, the main tax object of direct environmental taxes is motor fuel, even though 
recent years have seen a rise in excises on heating fules and electricity. Currently this means 
distributional impacts of environmental taxes to be progressive, this both with income and 
expenditure data. For indirect effects, environmental charges are considered additionally to 
aforementioned excises. Concerning different sectors, land transport stands out, as it obtains 
highest share of environmental taxes per production unit and highest proportion of 
environmental tax share in price. Yet, as in transport the share of expediture increases with 
income, this is not the case for most others sectors, namely housing, electricity and food 
industry. Alltogether, regressive pattern of indirect tax load of environmental taxes is 
prevailing. However, when accounting for both direct and indirect effects, total tax load 
remains progressive, ranging from 2.5% of expenditures for the lowest income decile to 
3.6% for the highest decile. (Poltimäe, 2014) 
3 Environmental and transport taxes in Europe and OECD 
In European Union, the highest share of overall environmental tax revenue is represented by 
energy taxes5, accounting for over 75% of EU-28 total. Transportation taxes signify one fifth 
of total environmental tax revenues for all member states, however this share changes from 
40% in Malta to 3.5% in Lithuania and 2.1% in Estonia (Eurostat, 2016). Furthermore, in 
Estonia transportation taxes account for 0.06% of total GDP and 0.2% of total tax revenues, 
both figures rank last among OECD countries (Annex 1).  
One element of such figures in two Baltic countries is that both in 2014 and currently in 
2017, there is no tax based on car ownership or related to vehicle emissions. This is contrary 
to most of developed world, as in 2016, 20 out of 28 EU member states had implemented 
CO2 based motor vehicle taxes, exceptions being Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
                                                 
5 This includes taxes on transport fuels 
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Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia (ACEA, 2016). However, out of eight 
countries listed, Bulgaria, Italy and Poland have implemented a tax based on either cylinder 
capacity or engine kilowatts, while Slovakia is notable for taxing vehicles based on its 
weight (Zahedi & Cremades, 2012).  
Pollutants with local health and welfare effects as NOx and PMx are usually not included in 
tax system. This expresses in rise of the share of diesel vehicles all over Europe (ACEA, 
2014), which, while producing significantly more NOx, on average emit less CO2. It is 
further shown climate mitigation policies can have negative effects on local air pollution, if 
CO2 savings are the result of switching fuel type to diesel, as was the case in Ireland (Leinert 
et al., 2013). One of few exceptions where NOx is taxed are Norway and Israel, where in 
latter the costs of NOx make up 71% of total costs of transport emissions (OECD, 2016). 
Simulations made there show twofold increase of NOx emissions if percentage of diesel car 
registration would be 20% instead of current 2%, showing dangers to public health of purely 
CO2 based programmes (Roshal & Tovias, 2016). 
In general, CO2 emission based taxes on vehicles are imposed either during registration or 
annually, in some cases both ways of taxation are used. There exists no clear trend whether 
to apply one or the other, as usage of recurrent and registration based taxes is roughly equal 
in Europe (ACEA, 2016), in spite of the fact that a political suggestion by OECD has been to 
rely on differentiated purchase taxes due to its immediate visibility and likely more powerful 
impact (OECD, 2009). 
Exact amount of tax depends on CO2 emission per km, occasionally further differentiation 
exists based on registration date and vehicle engine size or type (Table 1). For instance in 
United Kingdom, all mentioned dimensions are considered: Vehicles registered before 1st of 
March 2001 are taxed based on engine size; those registered before 1st of April 2017 are 
taxed based on fuel type6 and CO2 emissions; vehicles with later registration are taxed on 
CO2 in first year and fuel type each year after that. The exact payments for the most recent 
(April ‘17) tax rates vary from £10 (CO2 emissions 1-50 g/km) to £2000 (CO2 emission over 
255 g/km) in year 1 and up to £450 annually until year 5 after registration (GOV.UK, 2016). 
Different approach is used in Denmark, where “Green owner’s tax” is applied according to 
fuel consumption (km/l) of the vehicle for those registered after 1997, while older vehicles 
                                                 
6 Fuel types are separated as (1)electric, (2)alternative, including bio-ethanol, hybrids and liquid petroleum gas 
and (3)petrol or diesel. 
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are subject to vehicle weight tax. Yearly tax rates range from 310 DKK (ca 41€) in case of 
20+ km/l up to over 20 000 DKK (2 700+ €), when consumption is less than 4.5 km/l. 
However, Denmark also sees the highest vehicle registration tax among EU countries. 
(ACEA, 2016) Registration fee of a vehicle is progressive, as 105% of its value is paid for 
vehicles bought for less than 84 600DKK (11 378€) and 150% of the values for vehicles 
over said price. (Danish Minisry of Taxation, 2017). 
Only yearly tax higher than in Denmark, according to (Zahedi & Cremades, 2012), is found 
in Netherlands, where tax is built on weight and fuel type. For private vehicles, said tax rate 
can reach up to 994€ in every 3 months (Belastingdienst, 2017). The registration tax 
Belasting Personenauto’s Motorrijwielen (BPM) is progressive and differentiated for petrol 
and diesel. In case of latter, owner must pay €86.69 per each gram of CO2 that exceeds 
benchmark of 65 grams per kilometre. More steps are included for petrol engine vehicles. 
As most registration and circulation taxes are CO2-related, Israel has gone step further to by 
adopting a “Green Grade” formula including other pollutants (CO, hydrocarbons - HC, NOx 
and particulate matter - PM10) (OECD, 2016). Due to its resemblance to external cost 
methods used in empirical part of current dissertation, Israeli Green Tax and its social and 
environmental effects will here attain extended review. 
Green Grade formula, aimed at internalising part of private car external costs of 2.6% of 
GDP (EXTERNE, 2005), differentiates car models by levels of pollution, taking into account 
CO2 and four other pollutants listed above. Emissions of pollutants is weighted by estimated 
relative cost of each pollutant to the society (Green Tax Report, 2008), to obtain a “green 
grade” for each vehicle. Grade is split into 15 tax bands. 
Short term effects of Green Tax were noticeable, although somewhat bilateral. Since 
implementing tax in 2009, effect of the policy on the composition of vehicles by pollution 
level was apparent: Average pollution grade of 10 in 2009 fell to 7 in 2010 and further to 4 
in 2012, at the same time share of heavy-polluting vehicles fell from 23.5% to 7%. (OECD, 
2016). However, as differentiation between the levels of pollution by new cars became less 
noticeable, the tax had lost its effect on the distribution of emissions by 2012, witnessed 
correspondingly by sharply declining returns after year 2. What is more, with tax per vehicle 
lowering, cars became more affordable, thus increasing motorisation rate and causing a rise 
in total emissions even though average vehicle was now less polluting. 
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Therefore, pollution brackets were modified to recreate more differentiation between lower 
grades of tax system and extensive study (Becker, Rosenthal, & Gabay, 2012) was carried 
out to update the parameters in green grade formula by better estimation of external costs of 
pollution. Using results obtained by dose-response and benefit transfer methods, the study 
gave considerably more weight to health-related emissions of NOx and PM10. Updated 
formula in 2013 increased tax revenues by 25%, similar to original effect in 2009. Learning 
from this, Israeli government has called to update formula every two years in the future. 
The main effect of Green Tax scheme is thus considered to be slowing the increase of health 
related pollution and even lowering total PM emissions, whereas economic results based on 
tax revenues differ for first two years and later. 
Table 1: Private vehicle taxes in selected countries 
Country Purchase 
or annual 
Tax base Notes 
Denmark Both Price, CO2, 
fuel type and 
fuel 
consumption 
Registration based on price, with steps of 105% of vehicle’s 
value up to 84 000 DKK and 180% for remainder. 
Progressively differentiated annual tax based on fuel 
consumption and fuel type. Highest vehicles taxes in EU. 
Estonia None*  *Quarterly levied heavy goods vehicle tax. Can reach up to 
232€, most rates below 100€. 
Finland Both CO2, age, 
weight, fuel 
type 
First registration tax dependent on age and CO2, annual tax on 
CO2, fuel type and weight. Registration tax varies from 5% to 
50%, annual tax can reach 600€. 
France Both CO2 Registration and annual tax based on CO2, but considerable 
bonuses apply for purchasing low-emitting vehicles. 
Maximum registration tax 8000€ in case of emissions over 
250g/km, yearly maximum 160€ for CO2 emissions over 190. 
Israel Both CO2, CO, NOx, 
HC, PM10; age 
and price 
Registration based on “Green Grade” formula, which creates 
15 tax bands. Highest registration tax 83% of price, annual 
fees up to 995€ with most fees around 300€ 
Italy Annual Weight, engine 
capacity. 
Additional tax for cars registered less than five years ago – 
20€ per kW over 185 kW. 
Latvia Both Weight, age From 17€ (under 1500 kg) to 143€ (12 000+ kg) annually. 
12.6€ per year if older than 20 years.  
Netherlands Both CO2, price, 
weight, fuel 
type 
One of the highest taxes in EU context. Ownership of a lorry 
up to 1400€ annually, diesel cars 663.8 € at 1000 kg net 
weight per year + 104.08€ per extra 100 kg with other types 
cheaper; CO2 tax differentiated with numerous steps.  
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Norway Purchase CO2, NOx, 
weight, power 
4.97 € per mg NOx emitted per km driven, CO2 tax starting 
from 4900, however benefits for emissions under 50 g/km, 
rises with each g/km but with increasing speed at higher 
emissions. 
Spain Purchase CO2 CO2 based registration tax, differentiated regionally. Varying 
from 4.75% of car price in most regions in case of 121-159 
g/km up to 16.9% for 200+ g/km in Andalucía. 
Sweden Annual CO2, fuel type Progressive circulation tax based on CO2. 38€ per year + 1.6€ 
per g/km exceeding 100 g/km for petrol and respectively + 5€ 
for diesel vehicles. Considerably higher for vehicles registered 
before 2006. Premium is granted for low emitting vehicles. 
Switzerland Annual Engine capacity Regionally differentiated. For example in Canton de Fribourg: 
rates from 204€ annually for cylinder volume below 400 cc up 
to 712€ + 33 for each 200 cc above 6000. 
UK Both CO2, fuel type, 
age. 
Based on age of vehicle, engine type and CO2 emissions with 
numerous steps. Circulation tax different in year 1, years 2 – 5 
and later. For example registration is free for private vehicle 
registered after March 2001 but before April 2017 and can 
reach up to 531€ in case of 255+ g/km. After April, same 
amount results in tax of 2400€ in Y1 and 150€ in later years.  
Source: Compiled by author based on (ACEA, 2016) and (OECD Policies, 2017). 
4 Data and methodology 
4.1 Methodology 
Comprehensive list of data sources and layout of empirical part of current dissertation is 
listed below and can be seen in  Figure 3. 
For analysing distributional effects of various tax scenarios, income and vehicle ownership 
data from Estonian Tax Board (EMTA, in Estonian - Eesti Maksu- ja Tolliamet) was 
requested and used. It consists of physical or legal person7, one’s vehicle and its registration 
year and his or hers total personal income8 in 2015. Said data was available for vehicles 
registered in Estonia after 2008. For vehicles registered for legal persons, number of users 
and their combined incomes in said year were included. As no additional information in case 
of multiple users was available, average income of user was taken. For natural persons only 
                                                 
7 Term “legal person” is used throughout thesis to signify persons using company car, hence not 
company/institution itself but those using its vehicles. “Natural” represent persons who use their personal car. 
8 TSD (income and social tax declaration) registered personal income (i.e. salaries and fees taxable with social 
tax + board membership fees + contracting/agency agreement or other contractual agreement fees) + pensions + 
dividends + foreign earnings + other revenues 
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owners’ income was brought i.e. there was always only one user. Second EMTA dataset 
included CO2, fuel consumption and kilowatt records for roughly 50% of car park. 
 
Figure 3: Data sources and thesis methodology  
To include further information of CO2 emissions and additional data of fuel consumption, 
vehicle park data from Estonian Road Administration (Maanteeamet) was used and merged 
with EMTA datasets. NOx emissions, additional missing gaps and available evolution of 
Externalities in Estonian road transport: COPERT 2007
•Existing model, updated by following
Data request and updates by author
•EMTAK 2030+ : Energy use prognosis
•Estonian Environment Ageny: Relevant emission and mileage data
•Statistics Estonia - population prognosis
•Ministry of Finance: financial prognosis
Model update by author: externalities in road transport COPERT 2015
Data request from Statistics Estonia
•Calculating already internalized costs of road transport obtained by COPERT 2015
Collecting vehicle data
•EMTA: Vehicle ownership and individual level income data
•Road Administration: CO2, kW and fuel consumption data
•autoevolution.com, NextGreenCar.com; car manufacturer websites: Missing CO2, fuel, kW 
data, NO2 data estimations
Testing tax scenarios
•Vehicle tax preposed 2018
•Including localised health effects through NO2
•Tax internalizing passenger car transport externalities
Analysis of distributional effects of previous scenarios
•Share of income
•Gini, Kakwani, Reynolds-Smolensky
Discussion of policy implications
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figures for all variables listed above was obtained from databases of car manufacturers or 
collective databases including most vehicle-pollutant relations. 
During current dissertation, road transportation external costs were obtained by updating 
external cost model of 2007 with recent relevant emission data for CO, NMVOC(Non-
methane volatile organic compound), CH4, NOx, N2O, PMx, CO2, SO2, several metals; 
vehicle count and mileage by engine type; future energy use prognosis9 and various macro 
prognosis. Longer explanation on assumptions and COPERT is brought in Annex 2. All 
steps listed apart from calculating external costs in 2007 were completed by author of 
dissertation. 
Additionally to describing vehicle tax as a share of income, for assessment of distributional 
effects of vehicle taxes, descriptive distributional measures are used. These include the Gini 
coefficient, the Kakwani index and the Reynolds-Smolensky index, where Gini is to describe 
the inequality of incomes and latter two to appraise the progressivity of taxes. 
All measures named are essentially derived from the Lorenz curve (Figure 4), which orders 
people by the size of their incomes and plots the percentage of earnings by various shares of 
the populations, showing the deviation of person’s income from equality (Gastwirth, 1971). 
 
Figure 4: Lorenz curve (Sen & Foster, 2003) 
The Gini coefficient, one of the most commonly used measure of inequality, is a number 
expressing deviation of income of a particular Lorenz curve from absolute equality (Farris, 
2010), in other words showing the inequality in income distribution. Ranging from 0 to 1, 
                                                 
9 Mainly “Eesti energiamajanduse arengukava aastani 2030” (ENMAK 2030+), „Transpordi arengukava 2014-
2020” and GDP and population prognosis by Statistics Estonia and Ministry of Finance. 
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larger coefficient marks greater inequality. Mathematically, Gini index is twice the area 
between Lorenz curve and the absolute equitability line: 
(1) 𝐺 ≔ 2 ∫ [𝑝 − 𝐿(𝑝)]𝑑𝑝
1
0
 
where 𝑝 is the fraction of population representing 100p% of poorest population and 𝐿(𝑝) 
represents the fraction of the whole quantity of income owned by respective fraction of the 
population. Alternative way of finding Gini index is computing the covariance between the 
income values 𝑦𝑖 and their ranks 𝑖: 
(2) 𝐺 =
2𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑖,𝑖)
𝑛𝜇𝑦
 
where 𝜇𝑦is mean of income, n is number of people. 
The Kakwani index calculates the extent to which the inequality in the distribution of tax 
sizes differs from the inequality in income distributions, thus finding the level of 
progressivity (P>0) or regressivity (P<0) of tax (Padilla & Serrano, 2006). Mathematically 
(3) 𝑃 =  (𝐶 −  𝐺) 
where G is the Gini index of before-tax income and C is concentration index of taxes, 
derived accordingly to G, however instead of income, the amount of taxes paid is used. With 
Kakwani, population is now ordered by amount of tax paid. Kakwani index, however, is not 
seen as proper indicator to show the impact a change in the tax on income distribution, as 
while tax might by strongly regressive, the real effect is marginal due to the size of the tax. 
For such purpose, The Reynolds-Smolensky (R2S) measure of redistributive capacity 
(Reynolds & Smolensky, 1977) can be used, which captures the change amid pre-tax (𝐺𝑦) 
and post-tax (𝐺𝑦−𝑇) Gini index (Haughton & Khandker, 2009). 
(4) 𝑅2𝑆 = 𝐺𝑦 −  𝐺𝑦−𝑇  
Positive index value shows decrease in inequality, whereas negative indicates increase. 
4.2 Data 
Overall, there were 63108 vehicles in dataset, of which 22432 were owned by natural 
persons and 40676 people used company cars. Data only included car owners i.e. any person 
from general population without a vehicle is not included. 
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On average, most common years for registration were 2011 and 2012 - each with roughly 
11000 persons - least common were 2009 and 2015 with 8000 and 5100 respectively. 
However, differences occurred by person types, as for natural persons most common year of 
registration was 2009, followed by decrease in each new year. With company cars, years 
2011 – 2014 saw most registrations with least coming in 2009 i.e. company cars were newer 
on average.  
Average CO2 emission was 152 g/km, with 149 and 154 for natural and legal person vehicles 
respectively. A decrease in CO2 emission over the years is evident, with 165 g/km in 2009, 
156 g/km in 2011 and 138 g/km in 2015. This is in range of figures by Environmental 
Ministry, which set average CO2 emission of new vehicle in 2013 at 140 g/km (Ministry of 
Environment, 2016) and slightly below numbers of European Federation for Transport and 
Environment, where Estonian average CO2 emission of new cars was 147.2 g/km, ranking 
last in Europe and considerably below 126.8 g/km of EU27 average (European Federation 
for Transport and Environment AiSBL, 2014). Descriptive figures of vehicle park can be 
seen in Annex 3. 
Average power in dataset was 116 kW and has remained constant over the years, with 106 
and 122 for natural and legal persons. Figure exceeds one reported by AMTEL10 by 20 kW. 
NOx emissions were 120 mg/km with little differences by person type, larger emissions of 
130 can be seen in 2009 and 2010, with 116 in later years. 
To analyse distributional effects of various tax scenarios, dataset was split into 10 deciles by 
users’ income (see footnote 8 on p18). Overall, little differences between deciles can be seen 
in vehicle fuel consumptions and NOx emissions, whilst in power and CO2 ninth and tenth 
decile saw higher emission figures, with same trend when differentiating natural and legal 
persons. While similar tendencies, clear alterations occur in all variables, as legal persons’ 
income and vehicle figures are higher in every decile, as can be seen in Table 2. 
4.3 Data limitations 
57% of Estonian vehicles are over 10 years old, while roughly 22% are registered between 
2009 and 2015 (ACEA, 2014), dating Estonian vehicle park as oldest in EU. Current 
analysis includes vehicles registered after 2008, which may be ground for biased results 
while analysing distributional effects. As stated above, natural persons, who had lower 
                                                 
10 Maanteeameti ja Autode Müügi- ja Teenindusettevõtete Eesti Liit (AMTEL) 
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incomes in every decile, had more registrations in each earlier year in dataset, while for legal 
persons registration saw later years be more common. However, as average new vehicle’s 
emissions show trend of decreasing in time, restriction of data for studying only newer 
vehicles might diminish or weaken actual tax effects under assumption that less well-off 
people own older cars, which emit more and hence be the cause of bigger taxes. 
Simplifications were made while merging EMTA main dataset (D1) of vehicle owners with 
kW and fuel consumption dataset (D2), as while D2 had data based on year, manufacturer, 
model and engine type (petrol vs diesel), in D1 engine type was missing. Hence, either 
average of two types or the available one was assigned to D1, leading to reduced 
differentiation of vehicle park. To fill missing gaps in data and find possible yearly changes 
in emissions through models, manufacturer data and broad databases11 were used. However, 
mostly with NOx, as some gaps still remained, average values of similar vehicles (based on 
year and kW) were assumed to fill missing values. Additionally, NOx data is seen as 
unreliable and not meeting EEA standards (Department for Transport UK, 2016), thus 
related figures and implications ought to be used with cautionary. 
Whether this is a limitation or not might be of discussion, however aspect differentiating 
current thesis from most other in literature is use of individual level income instead of 
household level measures. In addition, only car owners are used in analysis, meaning 
distributional effects are found to owners of vehicles, not to general population. 
Possible questions arise with low income deciles. In 2015, minimum gross wage was 390€, 
which after considering taxes and minimum taxable income (EMTA, 2014) accounts for 
minimum net wage of 344€ and according yearly figure 4130€. In current dataset, there are 
4100 natural and 3000 legal persons with total yearly income below said number. Of legal 
causes, sickness and unemployment could be main factors for that. Unemployment 
allowance in 2015 was 4.01€ daily for 270 days, accounting for 1082€ yearly (Eesti 
Töötukassa, 2017). Unemployment insurance benefit in case of minimum wage of 2014 
would be lower, hence it is reasonable to assume in minimum wage case allowance would be 
chosen as two cannot be used simultaneously. Dataset contains 955 natural and 445 legal 
person with income under 1082€, which strongly influences tax effect on lowest decile. 
  
                                                 
11 http://www.nextgreencar.com/used-cars/ with NOx data, https://www.autoevolution.com/ for other variables 
24 
 
Table 2: Owner-vehicle characteristics by income deciles 
Decile Yearly 
income (€) 
Power 
kW 
CO2 g/km NOx mg/km Fuel consumption l/100km 
1 2014 112.6 151.8 120.0 5.8 
1 legal 2884 125.1 157.8 128.0 6.0 
1 natural 1150 104.9 149.1 112.5 5.7 
2 4932 115.0 153.8 120.6 5.8 
2 legal 6435 122.2 157.1 129.0 6.0 
2 natural 3550 101.8 146.0 114.6 5.6 
3 7907 114.6 152.8 122.1 5.8 
3 legal 9698 118.3 154.8 125.0 6.0 
3 natural 5139 106.0 149.6 112.2 5.7 
4 11 008 111.4 151.2 119.2 5.8 
4 legal 12 916 114.9 151.9 124.1 5.8 
4 natural 7887 105.3 148.1 114.0 5.6 
5 14 040 110.2 149.4 120.3 5.7 
5 legal 16 295 114.3 149.7 122.0 5.8 
5 natural 10 790 102.7 146.8 111.2 5.6 
6 17 425 110.5 148.4 118.5 5.7 
6 legal 20 096 113.8 149.1 122.5 5.8 
6 natural 13 512 102.7 146.2 112.6 5.6 
7 21 553 112.3 149.9 120.9 5.8 
7 legal 24 507 116.5 150.7 124.1 5.8 
7 natural 16 536 104.5 147.4 113.5 5.6 
8 27 191 115.3 150.3 120.4 5.8 
8 legal 30 547 119.6 150.3 120.0 5.8 
8 natural 20 662 106.4 149.5 114.8 5.7 
9 37 147 121.7 153.4 121.4 5.9 
9 legal 41 425 126.9 155.4 124.0 6.0 
9 natural 28 164 108.2 150.2 116.2 5.7 
10 108 838 141.0 163.0 124.6 6.3 
10 legal 118 976 149.9 166.0 126.2 6.4 
10 natural 87 059 119.3 157.0 119.1 6.0 
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5 Results and discussion 
5.1 External costs in Estonian road transport  
Estonian external costs have seen several estimation during recent decades. In 2002 (Loog et 
al. 2002) estimated external costs in land transport to range from 600 to 1000 million euros, 
however without including congestion costs. Using improved methodology and guidance 
based on (IMPACT, 2007) by European Commission, COPERT model was used in 200712 to 
estimate total cost of road transport to be 488 million euros, accounting for 3.1% of country’s 
GDP at time (Anspal & Poltimäe, 2008). 
During current dissertation model of 2007 has been updated by author by including 2015 data 
of various emissions; car park with engine and mileage specifications; updated macro 
variables and using new energy use prognosis13. 
In 2015, total external costs in Estonian road transport estimated at 556.8 million euros, which 
accounts for 2.7% of country’s GDP (Table 3). Largest share of externalities are due to air 
pollution, accidents and climate change, which altogether take up 1.8% of GDP. While the 
total sum of externalities has increased since 2007 (Anspal & Poltimäe, 2008), there can be 
seen a slight decrease in share of GDP with most modelled components, which is countered 
by rise in climate change. Explanations and presumptions used with all components can be 
seen in Annex 2. 
Roughly 62% or 340 million euros (Table 3) of total external costs in 2015 are internalized by 
various taxes or fees, mainly by fuel excise and insurance payments. Consequently, 216 
million are left uninternalized. However, part of excise tax is directed at road maintenance, 
which is classified under infrastructure costs and is kept separate from external costs in 
(IMPACT, 2007). When accounting for whole roadwork-related quantities, 104% or 580 
million are internalized. 
Principal segment of total external costs of 556 million is due to passenger cars with 366 
million external costs caused. Passenger cars see the largest share in all external cost types 
except for noise and soil/water contamination, where biggest costs are caused by trucks. 
                                                 
12 Methodology and results described by (Jüssi, Anspal, & Kallaste, 2008) and (Anspal & Poltimäe, 2008). 
13 Mainly “Eesti energiamajanduse arengukava aastani 2030” (ENMAK 2030+), „Transpordi arengukava 2014-
2020” and GDP and population prognosis by Statistics Estonia and Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 3: External costs in Estonian road transport in 2007 and 2015 
 External costs in 2007 and 2015 Internalizing taxes and their amounts, 2015 
 2007 mln 
€ 
2007 % 
of GDP 
2015 mln 
€ 
2015 % 
of GDP 
Tax/fee Internalized  
2015, mln € 
% 
internalized 
Up- and downstream 
processes14 
49.1 0.3 51.7 0.2 Fuel excise; 204(444)15;  
Climate change 54.3 0.3 116.4 0.5 Heavy 
vehicle tax 
5.1  
Congestion 27.7 0.2 19.5 0.1 Parking fees 6.9  
Accidents 138.2 0.9 137.2 0.7 Registration 
fees 
7.1  
Additional costs in urban 
areas 
11.4 0.07 14 0.06    
Noise 80.1 0.5 90.6 0.4    
Soil and water pollution 9.8 0.06 9.7 0.04    
Air pollution 117.2 0.8 117.4 0.6    
Internalized by fuel excise, 
heavy vehicles and 
parking fees 
488.1 3.1 556.8 2.6  223 (463) 41% (83%) 
Accidents Internalized by 
traffic insurance 
138.2 0.9 137.2 0.7 Insurance 
payments 
71 51.2% 
Internalized by excises 
and environmental fees16 
    Electricity. 
natural gas 
46.9  
TOTAL 488 3.1 556.8 2.7  340(580) 61% 
(104%) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
                                                 
14 These are indirect transport costs as producing, maintainance and final disposal of means of transport. 
15 Until 2014, 75% went for road repairs by law, since then road repair share is not legally fixed, although 
government has declared not to decrease total sum. In 2015, around 240 mln € was directed to roadworks 
which is represented in „internalized“ column as difference between first number that excludes roadworks and 
number in brackets that includes it. 
16 Electricity and natural gas excise, electricity procuding fees, liquid stock tax,  
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5.2 Distributional effects of selected tax scenarios 
5.2.1 Vehicle tax in effect 2018 
In March 201717, vehicle tax proposal was approved by Government of Estonia to set in 
effect in 2018. According to proposal, vehicles registered before 2015 would be taxed based 
on kW, starting from 150€ for registration or first change of ownership for cars under 50kW, 
then moving up 30€ or 60€ with each increase of 10 kW. Older cars are taxed less as tax is 
multiplied by 0.9 for 4 year old vehicles, with coefficient dropping to 0.2 for those over 10 
years old. Vehicles registered 2015 or later are taxed based on CO2 emissions, with 150€ for 
first registration or first change of ownership for emissions below 50 g/km up to over 600€ 
for emissions over 180 g/km. 
Share of said taxes for income deciles is depicted in Table 4. In general, both cases are alike, 
showing clear regressivity and higher shares of tax to income for natural persons. Strong 
regressive effects can be reasoned by small differentiation of tax sums, which is to say 
incomes differ more than characteristics of vehicles (see also Table 2) and said gap is not 
covered by small monetary alterations between different levels of emissions. Lesser effects 
for legal persons are due to income differences. 
Table 4: Government tax proposals, share of income 
 Kilowatt based tax (registration until 2015) CO2  tax (from 2015) 
Decile Yearly tax €, 
natural 
person 
% of 
income 
Yearly tax €, 
legal person 
% of 
income 
Yearly tax €, 
natural 
person 
% of 
income 
Yearly tax €, 
legal person 
% of 
income 
1 343.8 29.8 422.6 14.6 433.9 37.7 478.5 16.5 
2 330.6 9.3 410.1 6.3 414.3 11.6 471.1 7.3 
3 347.3 6.7 394.7 4.1 437.9 8.5 458.8 4.7 
4 344.2 4.3 380.7 2.9 428.4 5.4 443.8 3.4 
5 344.5 3.1 378.6 2.3 423.0 3.9 433.4 2.6 
6 333.9 2.4 375.3 1.8 419.6 3.1 422.9 2.1 
7 341.0 2.0 385.8 1.5 429.9 2.6 432.6 1.7 
8 347.0 1.6 396.4 1.3 438.6 2.1 426.5 1.4 
9 352.1 1.2 423.9 1.0 442.6 1.5 452.2 1.1 
10 396.1 0.4 510.0 0.4 479.0 0.5 514.5 0.4 
Source: Author’s calculations 
                                                 
17 Press release was issued through ERR: http://www.err.ee/584652/autoloiv-tuleb-astmeline 
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CO2 tax sum for natural persons ranges from 414€ for 2nd decile to 479€ for 10th and is 
roughly 5 to 45€ higher for legal persons. Tax stands at one third of yearly income for lowest 
income, share but is less than 4% for 5th and higher deciles, all figures are approximately 
40% lower for legal persons. Kilowatt based tax is nearly lower 90€ for every decile, while 
smaller differences are present for legal persons. 
To further analyse regressivity of vehicle tax, the Gini, Kakwani and Reynolds-Smolensky 
measures were calculated (Table 5). For CO2 case, as pre-tax Gini measured at 0.543 and 
post-tax Gini at 0.552718, Reynolds-Smolensky net redistribution effect was therefore 
slightly negative, showing increased inequality. Kakwani progressivity index was strongly 
negative at -0.5, confirming regressive character of tax design. Nearly identical figures were 
obtained for kilowatt based tax. 
Table 5: Progressivity/regressivity measures for all reviewed persons 
Measure CO2 tax kW tax 
Pre-tax Gini 0.543 0.543 
Post-tax Gini 0.552 0.550 
Reynolds-Smolesky -0.099 -0.072 
Kakwani -0.536 -0.502 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Years 2011 to 2014 have 18 000 to 20 000 yearly new car registrations with steady rise in 
numbers (ACEA, 2014). While latter figure would create revenues of 7 million euros for kW 
tax and 8.9 million euros for CO2 tax, assuming increase in registrations to 25 000 would 
mean respective numbers of 8.8 and 11.1 million euros. In total, however, there are 45 000 
car registrations (Statistics Estonia, 2017) - counting new vehicles and change of ownership - 
although only estimates can be given how many ownership changes have occurred with 
same vehicle19. When using 45 000 registrations, CO2 tax would return 20.9 and kW tax 
16.1 million. In every case, all figures remain magnitude below 360 million passenger car 
external costs and 200 million total uninternalized external costs from 2015 transport sector. 
                                                 
18 In dissertation, individual level Gini is found. As a comparison, OECD calculates household level Gini index 
in Estonia at 0.386 (OECD Stat, 2017). 
19 Followingly only number of new registered vehicles will be used 
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If regressive quality of tax might not be desired and flat nature is preferred, a CO2 tax 
forming 1.77% or kW tax making up 1.4% of yearly income for every decile would keep 
expected revenues constant. According CO2 tax sums for deciles are represented in Figure 5 
below. 
Attaining such quantities is unrealistic in reality, considering low differentiation between 
vehicle emission levels among deciles (Table 2). While steps and constants could be 
artificially added to connect CO2 levels to suggested tax levels for extreme deciles, the 
resemblance of vehicle emissions of first to ninth decile makes finding linear or exponential 
relationship unachievable without additional policy measures not connected to emissions. 
 
Figure 5: Sums (€) corresponding to distributionally flat CO2 tax 
Source: Author’s calculations 
5.2.2 Including localised health effects by nitrogen emissions – scenarios of Norway and Israel 
In most OECD countries, aim of taxation is CO2 and climate change (Table 1), other 
pollutants with local health and welfare effects as NOx are typically not included in tax 
system. NOx is taxed in Norway and Israel, where in latter the costs of NOx make up 71% of 
total costs of transport emissions (OECD, 2016). 
Current dissertation will first simulate effects of Norwegian tax (Table 9 in Annex 4), where 
NOx emissions are taxed linearly with 5€ increase of registration tax with unit (mg/km) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Natural person 20,4 62,9 91,1 139,8 191,3 239,6 293,2 366,4 499,5 1543,2
Legal person 51,1 114,1 172 229,1 289 356,4 434,6 541,8 734,7 2110
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escalation in vehicle NOx emissions. Two scenarios are analysed, either implementation of 
whole Norwegian vehicle tax20, in which case tax sums are adjusted by proportion of 
disposable income in two countries (Eurostat, 2016) or applying only NOx part of tax to 
proposed Estonian tax system (chapter 5.2.1). Hence, purpose of current subsection will be 
to analyse whether and to what extent it is possible to transfer one nation’s vehicle tax 
quantities and apply them to another country, i.e. in this case Estonia. 
Using Norwegean vehicle tax levels (for CO2, kW and weight) in Estonia would mean 
average tax of 4865 euros for legal and 3810 euros for natural persons, while still showing 
strong regressive effects (Annex 5). Due to similar NOx emission levels, NOx share is 
roughly constant of whole tax sum for each decile in both legal and natural case. Tax would 
result in total of 150 or 190 million euros tax revenues in case of 20000 or 25000 yearly 
registrations, however behavioural effects are to be expected, resulting in lower quantities in 
total revenues. Regressivity is further upheld with Kakwani index of -0.5. What is more, 
Reynolds-Smolensky net redistribution index measures at -0.12, showing considerably 
increased inequality post-tax. 
Adding merely NOx (and not CO2, kW or weight) part of same amount to proposed Estonian 
CO2 based system would result in tax increase of roughly 650€ per vehicle registration 
compared to case in chapter 5.2.1, with tax share decreasing with income. Regressivity 
measures indicate similar results as above, although to somewhat decreased extent. Total tax 
revenue now amounts from 22 to 27 million euros when disregarding behavioural effects, 
falling short of uninternalized 216 million in whole transport. 
In Israel, average emissions level (g/km) from CO2 of new vehicles is about 6600
21 times 
larger than NOx (OECD, 2016), however in the Green Grade formula, to reflect relative cost 
to society, per tonne cost of NOx is weighted 750 times more heavily than same amount of 
CO2. In Norway, a gram of NOx is 14 to 58 times more taxed than same quantity of CO2
22. 
When applying Israeli NOx-to-CO2 ratio of 750 to Norwegian formula using found figures, 
                                                 
20 Due to current data limitations, weight could be included by using EU average of 1390 kg (ICCT, 2015), 
however here this part of formula is omitted. 
21 In present dataset according gap of average emission levels is 1200, representing low average NOx emissions 
of newly registered Israeli cars (0.021 g/km in 2014) (OECD, 2016) with respect to corresponding European 
figures (ICCT, 2014). However, while in Israel the share of diesel cars can be considered marginal at 2%, the 
respective figure in Estonia stands below 40% (ACEA, 2014), contributing relatively more to health effects 
22
Based on Table 9, when vehicle emits 106g CO2, NOx to CO2 tax ratio is 4960/85.6=57.9. When CO2 
emissions approach infinity, NOx to CO2 ratio is 4960/{ lim
𝐶𝑂2→∞
(18423.1 + 351.4 ∗ 𝐶𝑂2)/𝐶𝑂2} = 4960/351.4 
= 14.1. As vehicles emitting below 106 are recipients of bonuses, these need to be focused separately. 
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instead of 4.96€/mg, milligram NOx emission would be taxed from 64.1€ to 265.7€. While 
such robust application would already be questionable in Norway, further use in Estonian 
context is not realistic. While direct calculation ignoring every behavioural, political and 
social aspect leads to 184 to 729 million euros of tax revenues (exceeding total transport 
externalities in Estonia), these figures only serve to illustrate potential complications and 
dangers of direct and robust application of another nation’s tax system without adjusting for 
local framework. 
5.2.3 Externalities based vehicle tax 
Following tax is designed to internalize external cost of 366 million caused by passenger 
cars, while taking into account Euro emission standards of NOx (ACEA, 2017), target to 
reach average CO2 emissions of new vehicles at 130 g/km in 2015 and restrict respective 
emissions at 95 g/km in 2020 (European Commission, 2017). This is to study the extent of 
which vehicle tax must reach in order to internalize the costs caused by car owners. Exact 
design of the tax and further comments can be seen in Annex 6. 
Table 6: Externalities tax 
 Vehicle registration tax 
Decile Yearly tax 
€, natural 
person 
% of 
income 
Yearly tax 
€, legal 
person 
% of 
income 
1 17084.1 1484.5 19562.9 678.0 
2 16312.6 459.4 19278.2 299.5 
3 17200.0 334.6 18468.8 190.4 
4 16879.7 214.0 17838.1 138.1 
5 16519.1 153.0 17032.1 104.5 
6 16436.3 121.6 16674.5 82.9 
7 16889.4 102.1 17113.4 69.8 
8 17463.6 84.5 16530.5 54.1 
9 17535.9 62.2 18061.9 43.5 
10 19402.0 22.2 20694.4 17.3 
Source: author’s calulations 
With 20 000 first registrations annually, tax results in 361 million euros yearly revenues 
assuming no behavioural effects. Mean tax sum would be around 16 000€, lowest for 
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middle-income deciles and highest for 10th, with legal persons paying a higher quantity but a 
lower share of income. Tax is strongly regressive with Kakwani index of -0.53, and 
increases inequality, illustrated by Reynolds-Smolensky index of -0.03. 
If flat tax is aimed, rate of 70.4% would result in equal tax shares, meaning first eight deciles 
would pay less than in original case in Table 6, however last two would see sizeable increase 
of tax. Precise tax sums within deciles are presented in Annex 7.  
Summary of all basic tax scenarios analysed in chapter 5 is shown in Table 7 below, with 
longer discussion of possible implications in following subchapter. 
Table 7: Summary of tax scenarios for natural person 
 Government CO2 NO2 - Norway Externalities tax 
Reference 5.2.1 5.2.2, Annex 5  5.2.3, Annex 6 
Decile Yearly tax € % of income € % € % 
1 433.9 37.7 6929 602.5 17 084.1 1484.5 
2 414.3 11.6 6583 185.4 16 312.6 459.4 
3 437.9 8.5 7069 137.6 17 200.0 334.6 
4 428.4 5.4 6828 86.6 16 879.7 214.0 
5 423.0 3.9 6599 61.2 16 519.1 153.0 
6 419.6 3.1 6510 48.2 16 436.3 121.6 
7 429.9 2.6 6643 40.2 16 889.4 102.1 
8 438.6 2.1 6837 33.1 17 463.6 84.5 
9 442.6 1.5 6933 24.6 17 535.9 62.2 
10 479.0 0.5 8055 9.3 19 402.0 22.2 
Gini pre-tax 0.543 0.543  0.543 
Gini post-tax 0.552 0.670  0.577 
Kakwani -0.536 -0.501  -0.538 
R2S -0.099 -0.127  -0.036 
 
5.3 Discussion and policy implications 
Taxation of vehicles based on their emissions, whether on registration or recurrently, is one 
directional trend, with gradually more nations using some way of taxing cars (ACEA, 2014). 
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Estonia, as one of the last countries with no vehicle tax (OECD Policies, 2017), has proposed 
kW and CO2 based taxation, where latter is used with newer and former with vehicles 
registered before 2015. 
Study of distributional effects shows strong regressive character of both systems, which falls 
in line with results on transport taxes obtained in Nordics (Ahola, Carlsson, & Sterner, 
2009), when income was used as denominator. In Estonia, although tax on motor fuels has 
been shown to be progressive (Poltimäe, 2014), no real comparable studies have been 
conducted. While regressive effects are consistent with nearby countries, the extent of 
regressivity is not, as in every scenario analysed, both Kakwani index of -0.5 and 
monotonously falling shares of tax-to-income indicate very strong regressivity. This is here 
reasoned with three following potential explanations:  
(1) In current dissertation, the income data is measured at individual level for car owners and 
not household level as is usually the case. This is to say, the author analyses tax effects not to 
whole population, but to vehicle owners, hence causing more variations indicated by indexes 
above. 
(2) Analysis of vehicle park by income indicates little differences within most deciles and 
only 10th decile can be seen to noticeably differ from others. In other words, while the 
wealthiest do register more powerful and polluting cars, the rest drive vehicles with 
comparable emission figures. Hence, person with higher income is due for same tax quantity 
as one with lower income, resulting in regressive tax. While small differentiation is 
undeniably magnified by occasional limitation of identifying engine type of vehicle, in 
which case average emission figures of gasoline and diesel was attributed, it is not solely 
sufficient to explain large similarities. Rather, registration year or age of vehicle could be 
seen as a more considerable reason. If hypothesizing that well off people may purchase 
newer, yet powerful and more polluting cars (Yurko, 2008), it is also evident that vehicle 
emissions have considerably decreased in recent years (ACEA, 2014), resulting in a trade-
off. 
(3) Tax steps proposed are too marginal, rise relatively less than income and thus will not tax 
higher deciles with similar share as lower ones. This applies particularly to most polluting 
vehicles owned by 10th decile, as while they are recipients of highest tax quantity in both 
CO2 and kW case, the average difference is measured in tens of euros, whereas yearly 
income gap is quantified in tens of thousands. Therefore, a suggestion to oversee and 
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escalate tax rates of highest polluting vehicles is given, which serves as a possibility to raise 
further revenues for internalizing external costs caused. This, however, ought to be done 
with consideration that extreme increase may lead to vehicles being registered in another 
country with more favourable conditions. 
Due to one-off character of proposed tax, CO2 tax of roughly 430€, making up between 3 
and 4 percent of annual income for medium deciles, will not serve as a considerable share of 
income over several years. However, while medium income person would possibly less 
affected, due to considerable share for first two deciles, suggestion to prolong payment and 
redistribute it to shares over extended amount of time needs to be made. While questions 
about potential remissions related to income can be of further discussion, this topic will 
remain beyond the scope of current dissertation. 
Proposed tax did not include other pollutants besides CO2. One possible reason is 
undoubtedly availability and reliability of other relevant pollutant emissions from vehicles. 
Likewise, should collection of missing data result in considerable costs, comparison of said 
costs and more complicated tax system vs benefits from elaborated tax system needs to be 
made. However, it is apparent that while CO2 is main cause of global climate change, 
localized health effects are more connected with PMx, NOx, HC and several other 
compounds23. Therefore, including these to tax formula would serve to internalize costs 
caused by vehicles to health. While this work would be suggested by author, it is of essence 
that when using research done and applied in other countries, simple robust transformation 
cannot be pragmatic solution, as was evident in chapter 5.2.2. 
With several updates to inputs of 2007 external costs model and tax return data of Statistics 
Estonia, uninternalized sum of approximately 200 million euros from land transport was 
calculated. Covering such quantity, assuming 30 00024 new vehicle registration or 60 000 
total registrations annually (Statistics Estonia, 2017), would result in tax starting from 3300€ 
to 10 000€ assuming no behavioural effects which is unreasonable assumption. Under the 
scope the thesis the main focus shifted to external costs of 366 million euros, which were 
caused by passenger car transport. Designed tax in 5.2.3 was to reach said figure, while 
considering EU emission targets (European Commission, 2017) and Euro fuel standards in 
place (ACEA, 2017). Resulting regressive tax near 18 000€ for new registrations yields over 
                                                 
23 See, for example, (WHO, 2003) and (Orru, 2008) 
24 Including passenger cars, lorries, buses, motorcycles, mopeds 
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100% of median persons income (~15600€) in dataset, and would be in range of projected 
average yearly income in 2018 so it is possible some considered vehicle registrations will be 
decided against, meaning in reality target is not reached. Distributionally, once again lower 
income deciles are significantly more affected, although now with wider scope. However, 
tax this size would matter relatively less for purchase of new vehicles, as if hypothetical car 
would cost 40 000€ pre-tax, additional 18 000€ results in 45% increase in price, whereas in 
case of used vehicles in range of few hundred up to 10 000€, tax share would be 
considerably larger and likely with more influence towards purchasing decision. Hence, tax 
sum in this range could be reasoned with environmental policy purpose of lowering average 
vehicle emission, while potential distributional concerns ought to be handled with other 
policy measures (OECD, 2010). 
6 Conclusion 
Taxation of transport is based on the theory of externalities, which lead to market failure 
through deviation from social optimum to a state where market prices no longer reflect social 
costs or benefits. Externalities investigated here, in framework of car transport, are negative, 
i.e. usage of cars will create negative effects to a not involved external party. Most notable 
externalities are air pollution, climate change, noise and accidents. Hence, additional taxes 
are needed to internalize caused costs and to restore efficient allocation. 
During current research, external costs in Estonian road transport in 2015 were calculated at 
556 million euros, of which 60% were internalized by various taxes and fees. Most of 
externalities - 366 million euros - were caused by passenger cars. 
While until now, taxing cars has not been used in Estonia, one-off vehicle registration tax 
based on engine power and carbon dioxide has been proposed to set in 2018. However, 
evaluation of proposal reveals strong regressive character of tax, as share of tax decreases 
with each income decile. Possible reason is large similarities of vehicle park emissions, as 
respective figures are not closely related to person’s income. 
For potential policy implications, two scenarios were created and analysed. Firstly, it became 
evident that tax design cannot be robustly transferred from another country without more 
extensive research of local and target country’s natural and socio-economical dissimilarities. 
When applying Norwegian and Israeli NOx part of vehicle tax into Estonian tax design to 
address caused localized health effects, previously obtained tax revenues increased by 
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magnitude, creating unrealistic and not applicable conditions. To investigate the effects of 
internalizing whole 366 million external costs of passenger cars, a tax based on EU wide 
emission goals and standards was designed to meet said quantity. Average tax sum collected 
at registration showed at 18000€ and as with base scenario, design possessed strong 
regressive character. 
While regressive effects obtained here fall into line with empirical results from Nordic 
countries, results are influenced by limitations that must be acknowledged. In some cases, 
data was missing clear indication, whether vehicle model was diesel or gasoline type. In such 
circumstances, average of two emissions was attributed, thus increasing similarities of 
average vehicles through dataset. Secondly, only vehicles registered after 2008 were used, 
leaving out older and likely more polluting vehicles that could have had further impact on 
distributional effects. Results are further affected by use of personal and not household 
income measures. 
For future research, one possible direction is to replicate present study with improved data 
and investigate current tax with respect to consumption, as is done commonly in papers 
studying distributional effects of transport as a whole. For wider research, study of 
behavioural effects in addition to distributional ones would reveal a more complete image of 
vehicle registration tax. 
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Annex 1 
Table 8: Environmental and transportation tax revenues in OECD countries, 2014 
 Environmental tax 
revenue, % of GDP 
Transport 
taxes, % of 
GDP 
Transport taxes, % 
of total tax revenues 
Transport taxes, % 
of environmental 
taxes 
Australia 1,91 0,66 .. 34,5 
Austria 2,88 1,35 3,15 36,0 
Belgium 2,03 0,73 1,63 34,0 
Canada 1,15 0,26 0,84 22,6 
Chile 1,20 0,25 1,25 20,8 
Czech 
Republic 
2,65 0,43 1,29 6,5 
Denmark 4,11 1,52 3,03 36,6 
Estonia 2,56 0,06 0,20 2,1 
Finland 2,88 0,92 2,10 31,2 
France 1,97 0,29 0,64 13,9 
Germany 1,94 0,33 0,90 16,3 
Greece 2,77 0,65 1,81 20,1 
Hungary 2,60 0,38 1,00 17,3 
Iceland 2,00 0,62 1,60 0,31 
Ireland 2,17 0,90 3,15 37,9 
Israel 2,97 1,32 4,25 44,4 
Italy 3,85 0,61 1,38 16,8 
Japan 1,48 0,50 .. 33,7 
Korea 2,54 0,73 2,97 28,7 
Luxembourg 2,00 0,14 0,37 7,1 
Mexico … 0,12 ..  
Netherlands 3,35 1,02 .. 29,4 
New Zealand 1,35 0,61 1,89 45,1 
Norway 2,12 0,92 2,35 42,6 
Poland .. .. .. 8,0 
Portugal 2,20 0,58 1,69 26,0 
Slovak 1,73 0,20 0,65 11,6 
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Republic 
Slovenia 3,86 0,46 1,25 11,7 
Spain 1,89 0,24 0,70 12,9 
Sweden 2,21 0,43 1,01 19,4 
Switzerland 1,76 0,84 3,11 41,6 
Turkey 3,83 1,22 4,23 29,3 
UK 2,32 0,58 1,81 24,2 
United States 0,72 0,26 0,98 36,1 
OECD 
Europe 
2,49 0,55 1,49 22,1 
OECD Total 1,61 0,43 1,39 26,2 
Source: compiled by author based on (Eurostat, 2016) and (OECD Statistics, 2015) 
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Annex 2 
Calculating external costs and COPERT 
External cost model enables to calculate costs of transport within different locations (cities 
vs countryside) and means of transport (passenger cars, trucks, small vans (väikekaubik), 
busses, electric trains, trains, motorcycles). In some cases (e.g. air pollution, climate change) 
Estonian specific emission data is usable, in other cases (e.g. noise) OECD Handbook unit 
values were used. 
Data, assumptions and calculations 
Social costs in transport are calculated dependent on total mileage data and unit costs within 
means of transport. Depending whether passenger cars, busses or motorcycles are 
investigated, this data includes number of vehicles and average mileage in categories of 
engine type, engine capacity, euro standard and weight. For (electric-)trains mileage is 
calculated based on real timetables. Future mileage prognosis are based on TTÜ calculations 
or assumptions of mild or no growth (e.g. motorcycles, trams). 
Climate change costs are found based on COPERT data for CO2, CH4 and N20 and mileage 
data. For trains/trolleys electric energy use data from AS Elektriraudtee is used, according 
CO2 calculated with EcoSense model in Stockholm Environment Institute. Diesel trains use 
vales from Handbook 2014, finding monetary costs is based on unit costs from same source. 
Since climate change is global external costs, no GDP or purchasing power adjustments were 
made. 
For air pollution emissions, such adjustments are made. In addition to various emissions, 
wear of studded tyres and according road exhaustion resulting in PM10 emission is 
estimated based on (Aasestad, 2008). Cost for trains are calculated based on Handbook unit 
costs, for electric transport local and regional environmental costs are found with EcoSense. 
External costs for noise are calculated based on Handbook 2014 unit costs, which are 
differentiated for day/night and countryside/city. Possible overestimation of countryside 
costs might occur due to low population density in Estonian countryside. 
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Congestion cost are calculated taking account only Tallinn and Tartu, which however are 
responsible for most Estonian traffic jams. Costs are calculated based on Stratum modelling, 
which describe total time cost of all vehicles dependent on traffic flows. 
For accidents real data and risk values of accidents are used, assigning different values for 
different types of injuries. 
For up- and downstream processes, soil and water contamination and additional costs in 
urban areas (time costs for soft traffic and pedestrians caused by traffic) Handbook unit 
values are used. 
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Figure 6: Vehicle park descriptive figures 
Annex 3 
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Annex 4 
Table 9: Norwegian vehicle tax 
Component Level of emissions Tax rate 
CO2 <50 g/km -4906.9 € - 126€*CO2(g/km) 
50 - 105 g/km -96.4 € * CO2 
106 – 120 g/km 85.6€ * CO2 
121 – 160 g/km 1284.0 € + 95.9€ * CO2 
161 – 250 g/km 18423.1 € + 351.4€ * CO2 
>250 g/km 18423.1 € + 351.4€ * CO2 
kW <70 kW 0€ 
70 – 100 kW 26.36€ per kW above 70 
101 – 140 kW 791.1€ + 84.9€ per kW above 100 kW 
 >140 kW 3845€ + 210€ per kW above 140 kW 
NOx 0+ mg/km 4.96€ * NO2 (mg/km) 
Weight <1150 kg 4.21 $ per kg 
 1150 – 1400 kg 4839.2 € + 10.2€ per kg above 1150 kg 
 1400 – 1500 kg 7132.9 € + 20.4€ per kg above 1400 kg 
 >1500 kg 8968.0 € + 23.7€ per kg above 1500 kg 
Source: Compiled based on (OECD Policies, 2017) 
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Annex 5 
Table 10: Norwegean vehicle tax implemented to Estonia (weight included) 
 
Table 11: Norwegian vehicle tax implemented to Estonia (without weight) 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Natural person 6929 6583 7069 6828 6599 6510 6643 6837 6933 8055
Legal person 8486 8268 7813 7439 7229 7063 7280 7366 8103 10476
% of income (natural) 602,5%185,4%137,6% 86,6% 61,2% 48,2% 40,2% 33,1% 24,6% 9,3%
% of income (legal) 294,1%128,5% 80,6% 57,6% 44,4% 35,1% 29,7% 24,1% 19,6% 8,8%
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Natural person 3841 3495 3982 3741 3511 3422 3555 3750 3846 4967
Legal person 5399 5180 4726 4351 4141 3976 4192 4278 5015 7388
% of income (natural) 334,0% 98,5% 77,5% 47,4% 32,5% 25,3% 21,5% 18,1% 13,7% 5,7%
% of income (legal) 187,1% 80,5% 48,7% 33,7% 25,4% 19,8% 17,1% 14,0% 12,1% 6,2%
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Annex 6 
Table 12: Internalizing tax 
Component Level of emission Tax rate € 
CO2 0 – 95 g/km 0 
96 – 130 g/km 150*CO2 
130+ g/km 5250 + 200*CO2 
NO2 0 – 60 mg/km 1*NO2 
61 – 80 mg/km 2500 
81 – 150 mg/km 5000 
151 + mg/km 12500 
Here CO2 level of 95 g/km is EU restriction after 2021, 130 g/km is target of 2015. NO2 
limits are set by Euro standards. 
To match 366 millions of passenger car transport, increasing constants of 15 and 20 in table 
above by tenfold would lead to tax steps of 0, 150*CO2 and 5250 + 200*CO2 totalling 229 
mln euros with average carbon tax sum around 11200€. For NO2 emissions, using gasoline 
tax levels and taxing emission respectively at 0, 2500€, 5000€ and 12500€ for rest would 
lead to roughly 145 million net revenues with average sum of 7100€. 
Hence, on average and on the basis on 20000 registrations, sum of just above 18000€ for 
registration would mean covering external costs of passenger cars. For natural persons 
highest sum would be paid by 10th decile (19800€), lowest by 6th (17175€) while Kakwani 
index of -0.54 confirms strong regressivity. 
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Annex 7 
 
Figure 7: Distributionally flat tax internalizing external costs 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Natural person 810,6 2500,7 3620,6 5555,8 7601 9518,2 11648 14554,6 19839 61293,4
Legal person 2032,3 4533,4 6831 9098,6 11478,5 14156,1 17264,2 21518,1 29180,4 83803,3
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